George W. S. Bailey. prove that mental phenomena in general are not self- intimating in sense (3). Armstrong's argument is based on two claims: (a) Introspective awareness and its objects are distinct existences. (b) If introspective awareness ...

The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. (...) It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

We re-examine the construct of Moral Hypocrisy from the perspective of normative self-interest. Arguing that some degree of self-interest is culturally acceptable and indeed expected, we postulate that a pattern of behavior is more indicative of moral hypocrisy than a single action. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate that a significant majority of subjects exhibited fair behavior, and that ideals of caring and fairness, when measured in context of the scenario, were predictive of those behaviors. Moreover, measures of Individualism/Collectivism (...) appear more predictive of self-interested behavior than out-of-context responses to moral ideals. Implications for research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Franz Boas, the major founding figure of anthropology as a discipline of America, came to the United States from Germany in 1886. Though this fact is widely known, the significance of Boas' roots in German intellectual tradition and late nineteenth century German anthropology remains obscure. The essays in Volkgeist a Method and Ethic explore the Germanic influences on Boasian anthropology and clarify their implications for the ethnographic practice that Boas promulgated.

How is art both distinct and different from the rest of human life, while also mattering in and for it? This central yet overlooked question in contemporary philosophy of art is at the heart of Georg Bertram's new aesthetic. Drawing on the resources of diverse philosophical traditions – analytic philosophy, French philosophy, and German post-Kantian philosophy – his book offers a systematic account of art as a human practice. One that remains connected to the whole of life.

To have dominion over the world is heady power, and the temptation to extend that world power into divine power can be unbearable. What happens then?

Cet article propose une réinterprétation du système des arts de Hegel. Il montre que ce système contient deux affirmations apparemment contradictoires. D’une part, Hegel soutient que les différents arts ont leurs propres potentialités et accomplissements, irréductibles les uns aux autres. D’autre part, il affirme que ces potentialités et accomplissements ne peuvent être compris que dans le cadre d’une conception d’ensemble de l’art pris en totalité. Loin de d’intégrer l’art comme un tout dans son système, Hegel combine une conception des différents (...) arts comme pratiques autonomes avec l’idée que les différents arts (en tant qu’accomplissements de ce qu’est l’art) sont des contributions au sein de contextes historico-culturels dans lesquels individus et groupes interagissent avec eux. Selon Hegel, les différents arts entrent dans des échanges dynamiques les uns avec les autres sur la base de leur enjeu commun, à savoir de fournir des impulsions productives au mouvement autonome des pratiques historico-culturelles. Les réflexions de Hegel sur l’art offrent ainsi une perspective sur l’unité hétérogène des arts. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a new and alternative perspective on the basic idea of Levinas’s philosophy. My claim is that the latter can be more appropriately understood not as a contribution to a new way of thinking about ethics or the realm of the ethical as such, but rather toward the theory of normativity. The goal of Levinas’s reflections on alterity is to exhibit the normativity that is in play in all modes of understanding. Levinas tries to understand how (...) intentional beings are normatively bound by one another. This paper tries to give answers to the questions of why Levinas addresses questions of alterity, what is distinctive about these questions according to his way of thinking, and why one should consider Levinas’ thought from the perspective of the articulation of a theory of normativity. (shrink)

Opposition: Obedience and authority in Exodus 32-34 / George W. Coats -- The theological significance of contradiction within the Book of the Covenant / Paul D. Hanson -- The renewed authority of Old Testament wisdom for contemporary faith / Wayne Sibley Towner -- A stylistic study of the priestly creation story / Bernhard W. Anderson -- "I will not cause it to return" in Amos 1 and 2 / Rolf P. Knierim.

Der Aufsatz unternimmt den Versuch, die grundlegenden Strukturen von Hegels Modell der Intersubjektivität zu explizieren, wie er es in der Phänomenologie des Geistes zeichnet. Dieses Modell antwortet auf die Frage, wie Anerkennung in intersubjektiven Beziehungen verwirklicht ist. Ich vollziehe nach, dass Hegels komplexe Antwort auf diese Frage weder in den Überlegungen zum Selbstbewusstsein noch in denen zur sittlichen Substanz vollständig ist. Sie komplettiert sich erst in seinen Ausführungen zum Gewissen.

The paper argues that the concept of second nature has two aspects that are inherently bound up with one another. Firstly, second nature has to be conceived of as a concept that has a critical force. Secondly, art has to be understood as an essential part of what second nature is. The paper explains these two dimensions of the concept by drawing on Hegel’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of second nature as the nature of essentially incomplete beings. Since the incompleteness in (...) question always has to be reproduced, human beings have to develop and constantly engage in practices of self-criticism. As a practice of self-criticism, art is constitutive of second nature understood in this way. Thus, the specificity of art is to be found in its form of self-criticism as articulated through objects, which for their part give orientation to beings that realize their second nature through their practices. In the end, art prompts them to revise and enliven these practices. (shrink)

New Essays on the Nature of Rights. Edited by Mcbride Mark.

The objective of this paper is to augment the business values literature by building upon research that claims individual value frames are subject to hierarchical re-scaling, value redefinition, and value removal or induction. In contrast to the person-organization cultural fit approach of value congruence, we postulate that the cognitive discomforts resulting from just-world needs, self-identity completion and self-concept maintenance, as moderated by contextual and dispositional variables, are resolved through the selection and accentuation of legitimating and justifying values that ultimately cast (...) the nature of the world as fair, complete central self-identities, and affirm the self. Research and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to provide a critical survey of arguments within recent analytic philosophy regarding the so-called “mind-body problem” with a particular view toward the relationship between these arguments and the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead (and Charles Hartshorne’s closely related views).1In course, I shall argue that Whitehead’s panexperientialist physicalism avoids paradoxes and difficulties of both materialist-physicalism and Cartesian dualismas advocated by a variety of analytic philosophers. However, and I believe that this point is not often sufficiently recognized, (...) analytic philosophy of mind is no monolith, and there are those who have found some form of panexperientialism to be attractive enough to merit serious consideration or even full-fledgedacceptance (David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, Ralph Pred, William Seager, and Galen Strawson among them). A critical discussion of such thinkers should beincluded in any adequate survey of the relation between process panexperientialism and the analytic tradition. Moreover, the revisionary strain of the analyticaltradition which looks to natural science for its construction of worldviews (Broad, Russell, Bunge, Carnap, Quine, etc.) would move us in the direction of examining arguments concerning Whitehead’s view and contemporary empirical scientific considerations. (For a discussion of the basic nature of analytic philosophy and the descriptive and revisionary approaches contained within it, see my Process and Analysis, 5-9, 12-13, 57; and McHenry.) Here I shall argue that Whiteheadian panexperientialism very naturally accommodates important aspects of quantum theory, including the top-down causation involved in neuroplastic phenomena under a quantum mechanical interpretation of brain processes and in so-called Quantum Zeno Effect. The overall picture which emerges is that Whitehead’s position is (at the very least) a strongly plausible alternative in philosophy of mind.While I must confess that this essay can only represent the merest sketch—indeed an adequate treatment of the richly complex interpretive, comparative, and substantive philosophical issues here requires at the very least a monograph—I nonetheless hope to present a coherent and useful précis of major arguments and comparative conceptual relationships, especially for the reader who may not be readily familiar with this terrain. I thus hope that this essay will serve as a short expository and critical introduction to the interface between process and analytic philosophy of mind, and a presentation of the several theoretical advantages gained by listening to Whitehead’s theory as it connects with concerns of analytic philosophers.I shall proceed by first working though the main outlines of John Searle’s important and widely reaching “The Recent History of Materialism,” an essay which exposes critical flaws in a variety of materialist theories in ways which Whiteheadians should find especially fitting and congenial. I shall then examine defenses of dualism and the relation of Whitehead to such defenses, followed by a separate section on Chalmers, Nagel, and Pred. I will then consider a number ofimportant objections to process panexperientialism, including objections arising from the work of Jaegwon Kim and John Searle. I close with a discussion of thementioned empirical scientific arguments. (shrink)